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Abstract 
 
Rationale, aims and objectives: To explore stakeholder perspectives of the 
implementation of a new, national integrated nurse-led telephone advice and consultation 
service (NHS 24), comparing the views of stakeholders from different health care 
organisations.  
 
Methods: Semi-structured interviews with 26 stakeholders including partner organisations 
located in primary and secondary unscheduled care settings (general practitioner (GP) 
out-of-hours co-operative; accident and emergency department; national ambulance 
service), members of NHS 24 and national policymakers. Attendance at key meetings, 
documentary review and email implementation diaries provided a contextual history of 
events with which interview data could be compared. 
 
Results: The contextual history of events highlighted a fast-paced implementation 
process, with little time for reflection. Key areas of partner concern were increasing 
workload, the clinical safety of nurse triage and the lack of communication across the 
organisations.  Concerns were most apparent within the GP out-of-hours co-operative, 
leading to calls for the dissolution of the partnership. Accident and emergency and 
ambulance service responses were more conciliatory, suggesting that such problems were 
to be expected within the developmental phase of a new organisation. Further exploration 
of these responses highlighted the sense of ownership within the GP co-operative, with 
GPs having both financial and philosophical ownership of the co-operative. This was not 
apparent within the other two partner organisations, in particular the ambulance service, 
which operated on a regional model very similar to that of NHS 24. 
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Conclusions: As the delivery of unscheduled primary health care crosses professional 
boundaries and locations, different organisations and professional groups must develop 
new ways of partnership working, developing trust and confidence in each other. The 
results of this study highlight, for the first time, the key importance of understanding the 
professional ownership and identity of individual organisations, in order to facilitate the 
most effective mechanisms to enable that partnership working.  
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Introduction 
Increasing patient access to unscheduled primary health care is a recurrent theme of the 
UK Government’s health policies (Department of Health 1997; Department of Health 2000; 
Scottish Executive 2000). Service developments have included walk-in centres, 48-hour 
access to an appropriate health care professional and 24-hour nurse-led telephone 
consultation, advice and health information services.  These developments have 
necessitated new ways of working within the NHS, with nurses adopting a greater role in 
triage, treatment and referral decisions (Rosen & Mountford 2002; Sibbald et al. 2004). 
The establishment of nurse-led telephone consultation services has particular implications 
for health care delivery, as this model of care cuts across established boundaries of 
organisations, blurring the traditional demarcations between health care professionals and 
changing the nature of the patient-professional interaction (Pettinari & Jessop 2001). Thus, 
a greater understanding of these new organisational arrangements is required (Davies 
2003). 
 
The devolved nature of UK health care (Hunter 1979; Pollock 1999; Smith et al. 2004; 
Hopton & Heaney 1999) has led to increasing variation in service developments between 
the four countries of the UK. Nurse-led telephone services are no exception to this trend. 
In 1997, NHS Direct was established in England with the aim of providing callers with 
health information, advice on self-care or on the most appropriate service to contact 
themselves to meet their clinical need (Department of Health 1997). It was also hoped that 
it could reduce unnecessary demands on other NHS unscheduled care services, in 
particular GP out-of-hours co-operatives, accident and emergency departments and the 
ambulance service (NHS Executive 1998). Evaluation of NHS Direct demonstrated that its 
impact on these other services was minimal, with only GP co-operative activity showing a 
small but significant reduction in activity (Munro et al. 2000). This was attributed to the 
stand-alone nature of the NHS Direct sites, with an inadequate transfer of patient 
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information between the services and the superimposing of NHS Direct on existing 
structures of immediate care (Shekelle and Roland 1999). In other part of the UK, NHS 
Direct Wales was established at the same time as NHS Direct and with a broadly similar 
remit; no equivalent service was established in Northern Ireland.  Scottish health policy 
chose to learn from the English experience, delaying the establishment of a nurse-led 
service (NHS 24) until 2002. 
 
NHS 24 has similar aims to NHS Direct, including nurse-led consultation, advice and 
information and the alleviation of pressure on other NHS services (Scottish Executive 
2000). However, in an attempt to avoid the stand-alone approach of NHS Direct, NHS 24 
was designed to integrate with other partner organisations, namely GP out-of-hours co-
operatives, accident and emergency departments and the ambulance service. By 
developing innovative information management and technology (IM&T) links, patient 
information and triage decisions elicited by the nurse could be passed from NHS 24 to the 
partner organisations by electronic or faxed messages. However, the success of this 
integrated service depended on the reliability of the IM&T links, the confidence of nurse 
advisors to make an appropriate triage decision without seeing the patient and the 
confidence of the partner organisations to accept those decisions.  This partner confidence 
would be key to the establishment of successful working relationships.  
 
Shared understanding of professional ethos and identity is a pre-requisite for mutual 
confidence between two organisations. This is particularly important if one professional 
body dominates an organisation. Hunter refers to this as “tribalism”, reminding us that 
tribes have different goals and perceptions regarding effective care (Hunter 1996). New 
ways of delivering health care thus requires professional groups to acknowledge and 
respond both to their own organisational identity and to those of others. Failure to do so 
may lead to conflict and misunderstanding between the organisations trying to work 
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together to deliver effective health care. Again, this will be particularly relevant where 
different professional groups are no longer working within the same physical environment 
or location and where the responsibility for care is being shifted from one organisation to 
another. This shifting of responsibility can impact on those providing care. Several studies 
have shown that an unintended consequence of the movement of health care work from 
one professional group to another is the creation of uncertainty with regard to professional 
identity and a fear of losing power and autonomy to other professions (Williams & Sibbald 
1999; Elston & Holloway 2001; Degeling et al. 2001). 
 
With the development of nurse-led telephone triage and consultation services, health care 
delivery is shifting from one set of professional boundaries and organisations to another. In 
the nurse-led telephone services, nurses are the only providers of care whereas general 
practitioners are the predominant professional group in out-of-hours co-operatives. In 
accident and emergency departments doctors and nurses work together; in the ambulance 
service, there are few doctors, calls are taken by trained call handlers, then passed onto 
paramedics. These different structures may impact on the way in which the organisations 
are able to work together to achieve successful implementation. 
 
This paper aims to explore stakeholder perspectives on the implementation of NHS 24 in 
its first site, comparing the views of different health care organisations, to ascertain 
obstacles to successful integration with partners, and to offer more general comment on 
why the partners shared common concerns yet responded differently.  We suggest that 
shifting organisational identities and ownership may have had some bearing on partner 
responses to key concerns about workload, nurse triage and communication. This has 
implications for future policy and service developments.  
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Methods 
The findings reported in this paper are part of a larger, national evaluation of the 
implementation of NHS 24. This work has adopted the theoretical approach of realistic 
evaluation (Pawson & Tilley 1997) in order to understand how the social contexts in which 
the service was being implemented may impact on its success or otherwise. This 
approach has allowed the integration of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in 
order to test and explain the phenomena identified at both a national and local level.  
 
A contextual history of the process of implementation was obtained by attending key 
meetings, both in the first site and at the organisation’s Executive Team and Board. Key 
informants completed a weekly electronic diary highlighting notable events, both positive 
and negative. Key papers, including Board papers were reviewed to identify pertinent 
issues at the time and to review the response of NHS 24 to those issues.  Field notes and 
documentation were used to monitor developments in the implementation of the 
organisation. Interview data could then be compared to this contextual history. 
 
During 2002-2003, we conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-six respondents, 
to understand stakeholder views on the development and implementation of NHS 24 in the 
first site.  The interviewees were purposively selected to cover each of the partner 
organisations, NHS 24 itself and key area and government organisations.  Respondents 
included five from the integrated out-of-hours co-operative (out-of-hours co-op), two from 
the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS), two from the local Accident and Emergency 
department (A&E), ten interviews with NHS 24 employees from various levels, and seven 
from “interested” organisations such as the Primary Care Trusts1, Scottish Executive 
Health Department and management consultants involved in the implementation and 
                                                     
1 Primary care trusts in Scotland were statutory organisations broadly equivalent to primary care 
groups and trusts in England, but with no power of commissioning.  
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development of NHS 24. Interviews were usually conducted face-to-face, lasting between 
forty and ninety minutes. A generic interview schedule was designed from a review of NHS 
Direct evaluation studies (Pearce & Rosen 2000; Mark & Shepherd 2001), issues raised 
during the non-participant observation of meetings and the return of e-mail implementation 
diaries.  The interview schedule was piloted on two respondents and reviewed: the pilots 
were not included as part of the formal analysis. Interviews began after the service was 
introduced in northeast Scotland (May 2002) and continued over one year.  Assurances of 
confidentiality were given and anonymity maintained throughout by pseudonym use.  
 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Scottish multi-site research ethics committee and 
ratified by the local research ethics committee. 
 
Analysis 
Interviews were tape-recorded, with permission, transcribed verbatim and inputted into a 
qualitative data analysis software package (QSR NU*DIST 6). Interview transcripts were 
read intensively by GH and by other members of the team and emerging themes and sub-
themes discussed.  Analysis was iterative and informed the on-going process of 
interviewing. General thematic codes were identified first (e.g. employment, 
communication relationships, integration with partners, implementation, experience and 
expectations of NHS 24, organisational structure and culture).  These were then broken 
down further into smaller sub-themes (e.g. employment was broken down into current, 
length, nature, and previous; experience into positive, negative and key messages) (Miles 
& Huberman 1994). A constant comparative approach was used whereby the codes and 
the transcripts were continually re-assessed and re-interpreted (Glaser & Strauss 1968). 
These major themes and sub-themes were then used by GH to construct a coding 
framework and verified by other members of the research team, who re-coded a selection 
8
of interview transcripts. These were compared with the original coding undertaken by GH 
and areas of different interpretation resolved during team meetings.  
 
Results 
Data from attendance at key meetings involving the partner organisations (GP out-of-hours 
co-operatives, A&E and the ambulance service), return of email diaries and review of 
documentation allowed the construction of a contextual history of the process of 
implementation. This history, along with the interviews, highlighted three areas of concern: 
increasing workload; nurse triage; and communication difficulties. These are discussed in 
turn before considering the impact of organisational identity on these views. 
 
Contextual history. 
NHS 24 was rolled out across Scotland in a phased introduction, starting with one area in 
the northeast of Scotland in May 2002. There were three integrated partners. The first was 
an established GP out-of-hours co-operative with approximately 200 GP members, a 
population base of 350,000 and covering a mixed urban/rural setting (Thomson et al. 
2003). This co-operative had previously undertaken its own telephone triage using GPs 
and offered patients home visits, centre consultations or telephone advice, depending on 
clinical need. In common with other out-of-hours co-operatives, it had been set up as a 
limited company, with all GPs sharing in its the financial ownership. The second partner 
was a large accident and emergency department located in an acute hospital setting; the 
third was the Scottish Ambulance Service, which operated from several regional call 
centres. 
 
The headquarters of NHS 24 was located in the west of Scotland, approximately 150 miles 
from the first site, so the organisation’s Executive Team was not locally based. Instead, a 
Service Integration Team (SIT) consisting of local NHS 24 staff and members of the 
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partner organisations was established. Calls to NHS 24 initially went to one call centre, 
located in the northeast. In November 2002, NHS 24 began operating in the west of 
Scotland and a second call centre, located in the west, was opened. At busy times, one 
call centre could handle calls on behalf of the other centre, a process known as 
“virtualisation”. Neither of these call centres were co-located with the existing GP out-of-
hours co-operatives in their area.  
 
Over the first six months of operation, increasing tensions and difficulties between NHS 24 
and the GP co-operative partnership were identified; these were less apparent in the 
partnerships with A&E and the ambulance service. Tensions centred on a perception of 
unsustainable increases in workload, inappropriate triage decisions made by NHS 24 
nurses and unreliable IM&T links. This culminated at the end of the six-month period, with 
co-operative members voting on whether to remain in partnership with NHS 24.  NHS 24 
responded to this with the instigation of a Quality Improvement Plan, a document that 
explicitly identified and sought to address communication, information technology and 
clinical quality issues.  Meetings with other partners indicated similar issues, with initial 
increases in workload, communication lapses that might have led to inappropriate 
admission procedures and concerns about the clinical safety of telephone triage. However, 
at no time did they suggest leaving the partnership with NHS 24.  It is against this 
background that the interviews took place. 
 
Increasing Workload 
Respondents from the GP out-of-hours co-operative repeatedly highlighted concerns 
about initial increases in clinical activity, the time taken for patients to access and go 
through the NHS 24 triage process and the number of patients prioritised by NHS 24 as 
requiring to be seen by a GP within thirty minutes. These factors were all said to contribute 
to a sense of increasing workload. Some respondents did suggest that GPs now spent 
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less time on telephone triage, but with no concomitant decrease in shift work.  This 
perception of increased activity immediately post-launch contributed to widespread 
membership dissatisfaction: 
 
…but the membership of [out-of-hours co-operative] became very vehement in terms of 
the activity levels that we were seeing as soon as the integration process started, and 
indeed to date (Co-op 3) 
 
Both the ambulance service and A&E also suffered from an initial workload increase 
although at the time of interview (< 7 months after implementation) this was reported to be 
tailing off. They accepted this as part of the organisational development of NHS 24.  
Opinion from the ambulance service was that NHS 24 had quickly resolved the increase in 
it’s activity and that the service was dealing with fewer trivia calls from the public.  In A&E, 
one respondent was “impressed” by the rapid response of the NHS 24 organisation to 
increasing admissions: 
 
I was impressed by the relationship the partners built up during those first few weeks.  It 
was a case of, the guys from NHS 24 and me initially on at least a weekly basis to start off 
with and then when the integrated partners, that was on a weekly basis and then luckily 
we’ve reduced down to appropriate levels considering the crisis we had at the beginning 
(A&E 1) 
 
Nurse triage 
The nurse-algorithm interface and respondents perceived lack of confidence in telephone 
triage were held partly responsible for the reported workload increase.  Interviewees from 
all of the partner organisations viewed the computerised decision support software 
algorithms as rigid and mentioned the experiential component of triage.  A secondary care 
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respondent outlined why clinicians required convincing about the robustness of the 
algorithms by suggesting that: 
 
An assessment by definition is done by people who see, talk and communicate with the 
victim and you need to feel them, so to speak, and that is why clinicians will have a very 
intuitive distrust of a telephonic assessment (A&E 2).   
 
He went on to elaborate that assessment is a “people thing” that can be facilitated by IT 
but not led by it.  In contrast, the ambulance service respondents were sympathetic and 
understanding of the difficulties that nurse advisors faced in the initial move from face-to-
face contact to telephone diagnosis: 
 
There was an increase in [patient] calls and if the nurses had seen that patient face-to-face 
they might not have been so ready to get an ambulance … They were over-cautious and 
erring on the safe side.  We had to have dialogue every day.  We came down every day 
and said this can’t go on we’re suffering (SAS 1). 
 
However, A&E consultants and ambulance service staff are more likely to have one-off 
contacts with patients, with previous knowledge of the patient unnecessary in dealing with 
that contact. This contrasted with the long-term knowledge that GPs felt they had of their 
patients, which clearly spilled over into the out-of-hours setting. GPs pointed to their 
experience of triage in the out-of-hours co-operative and suggested that knowledge of the 
patient aided them during the telephone consultation, especially if they felt that the patient 
was trying to “work” the triage to their favour. 
 
I know when a patient phones me I set off with a certain amount of information and know a 
fair amount about that patient.  Without that information I’m really then stuck.  Some 
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patients can emphasise various components of their problem to make it important that you 
see them.  (Other Co-op 3).   
 
GPs also shared the view of the ambulance service respondent that the nurses lacked 
experience in dealing with the undifferentiated problems that present in primary care, 
leading to over cautious triage.  
 
NHS 24 put local measures in place in an attempt to resolve these difficulties. A reciprocal 
arrangement was established where out-of-hours co-operative GPs began “walking the 
floors” in the nurse NHS 24 centre and nurse advisors spent time in the out-of-hours 
centre. This had important relationship gains, training benefits and increased 
understanding of the others organisation.  Subsequently, nurses rotated into the primary 
care emergency centre, and triaged calls from there. However, this measure met with 
limited success and was stopped within several months. 
 
Communication 
Communication impacted on the organisations in two ways: day-to-day communication 
between organisations and call virtualisation. Both of these depended on the reliability and 
status of the information technology (IM&T), which at the time of the interviews, was 
subject to periods of downtime. This downtime impacted on the electronic transfer of 
patient information between the organisations, in particular the out-of-hours co-operative 
and was felt by GPs to impact on clinical safety. In such situations, communication 
reverted back to the use of fax machines and telephone calls. 
 
Most respondents also commented on the lack of communication between NHS 24 and its 
partners.  NHS 24 headquarters was geographically distant from the first site, leading to a 
perception of a stand-alone or independent service - a “fortress mentality” suggested one 
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out-of-hours co-operative respondent (Co-op 1).  Other stakeholders suggested that 
communication had not been two-way and claimed “that NHS 24 should listen a bit more 
and do a little less of the Power-point” (Primary Care Trust 1).  In defence, one NHS 24 
executive team respondent brought attention to the time scale involved in the 
implementation of the service suggesting that, “if you have to get everyone to agree to 
everything, then frankly you can only go at 1mph” (ETM 2).  However, this speed of 
change exacerbated existing tensions in communication and inhibited the building of 
relationships. 
 
Call virtualisation, the ability of one contact centre to be able to take calls from another 
usually, but not always, at time of high demand, was another area where communication 
was an issue.  Here, respondents from the ambulance service were the most positive 
compared to other partner organisation interviewees.  The “fail-safe” aspect to 
virtualisation, i.e. the ability to ensure that the service remained available during periods of 
peak demand was highlighted.  However, the pay-off for being able to build in this 
fundamental component to the system was a perceived loss of local sensitivity or 
knowledge, which according to some, had developed via historical or geographical 
necessity and was synonymous with the GP co-operative.  
 
The ambulance service respondents were comfortable with the management of this “local” 
and “national” dichotomy given that this is an inherent part of the service they offer and 
one that they have experience of.  For them, the issue of local knowledge and sensitivity 
was much less important: 
 
That isn’t to say something will go wrong one day, but if you think we’re handling over 
1000 calls a day right on that basis.  [SAS 2]   
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However, for those in the North centre overcoming the hurdle of “local knowledge” was 
often compounded by the aforementioned I&MT difficulties: 
 
 …nurses are struggling with the geography up here [North] and they belong to this area 
and the customisation that’s required from the North is considerable, … And often because 
of a technology difficulty, we might not get information that we need or who is on call that 
night.  [SIT 1]. 
 
Organisational identity 
In general, the GP out-of-hours co-operative was the most negative in its response to NHS 
24.  This was noted by other partner organisations and by NHS 24 itself.  One explanation 
put forward for this scepticism was that NHS 24 was seen to be politically driven.   
 
How do you establish partnership in something that’s seen to be politically driven, actually 
driven by politicians?  That’s been very hard, you know, the old adage of “if you’d given the 
money to us [GP Co-op] we’d have delivered, we’d have been able to develop and deliver 
the service locally”.  They may well have been, I’m not trying to argue that that wouldn’t 
have been a model of delivery, but they’d never have had the investment in technology or 
indeed continued ability to invest in that technology “if we’d split that money 15 ways”.  
(NHS 24 ETM 4). 
 
The argument against creating a franchised service around existing GP co-operatives 
was that NHS 24 was a national standardised service, cross-cutting different areas and 
services.  The desire of GPs for a more franchise-based service reflected the tradition of 
GP ownership of co-operatives, which had been established as limited companies.  GPs 
felt that NHS 24 did not recognise the benefits of this nor recognised the multi-faceted and 
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individualised nature of the co-operative membership and the organisational style in which 
the co-operative Board was not in control but represented the opinions of all its members: 
 
…, the Board of Directors, don’t run a company with employees.  All that we are, are the 
instruments of 252 members.  A voice… (Co-op 1).   
 
An additional factor at play was the deep sense of pride that GPs had in the development 
of the out-of-hours co-operative as a model of care.  The view was often expressed that 
the level of care delivered had been of a high quality and was less expensive. 
 
I think on the whole they [NHS 24] are now doing it not too badly but I overall feel that 
after a huge amount of effort spent in the integration exercise and the post-integration 
exercise we now have got a system [that] because of the huge investment is only 
marginally worse than that which existed before (Co-op 6) 
 
Having the locus of out-of-hours care removed from the co-operative impacted on GPs, as 
they perceived their control and autonomy over clinical decisions to be diluted. This was 
suggested by several respondents to be at the route of GPs’ hostility towards NHS 24, 
which was causing them to lose “their identity, they were losing their local focus.  They 
were losing their doctor triage” (NHS 24, SIT 1).  One ambulance service respondent 
suggested that NHS 24 was perceived as a threat by GPs to their primary care domain: 
 
So the whole campaign [NHS 24] was about being a softer organisation, it’s a listening 
line, an advice line, unthreatening, help yourself and all the rest of it, and also the strap 
line was very much about “in addition to other services”.  That was the bit you could never 
get across to the GPs, they always thought it was taking over and it’s a new service (SAS 
2). 
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One way in which NHS 24 tried to counter such negative responses was through the use 
of “champions” or “charismatic leaders” (Mark & Shepherd 2001), who aided recovery 
work on this and other clinical aspects of the service. Medically qualified, previously GPs 
and now employed within NHS 24, these individuals were noted for their capacity to 
champion the service in clinician circles and to enhance clinician-clinician communication 
through a shared understanding of primary health care delivery. 
 
Discussion 
This paper is part of a larger study evaluating the implementation of a national, integrated 
nurse-led telephone consultation service, providing unscheduled care and integrated with 
GP out-of-hours co-operatives and accident and emergency departments across Scotland 
and with the national ambulance service. This integration of organisations is a key 
difference from other nurse-led telephone services, such as NHS Direct, and affords the 
first opportunity to explore the way in which these organisations respond to each other. 
The work here represents qualitative findings from a detailed case study undertaken in the 
first site. Interviews were conducted with a range of key informants, selected on the basis 
of being to provide an organisational perspective to the process of implementation, rather 
than a purely personal perspective. For example, one of the interviewees was the clinical 
director for A&E services at the first site. The issues and concerns raised during the 
interviews were also apparent during observation of key meetings, reading of NHS 24 
Executive Team minutes and Board meetings and were raised in the electronic diary 
returns. Findings are also consistent with work exploring the implementation of NHS 
Direct, in which GPs saw the out-of-hours co-operatives which they were instrumental in 
setting up become part of a wider nurse-led telephone consultation service (Pearce & 
Rosen 2000; Mark & Shepherd 2001). 
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Each of the integrated partners identified increasing workload, the clinical safety of nurse 
triage and a lack of communication between the organisations as key concerns. These 
were clearly genuine concerns and, in the first weeks of service implementation, the 
perception of increasing workload and inappropriate triage was supported by analyses of 
NHS 24 and integrated partners activity data (unpublished data). However, this appeared 
to be reducing by the time that most of the interviews were being conducted. What was 
also clear from the contextual history of the organisation was the rapid pace of 
implementation across Scotland, with other sites integrating with NHS 24 within a few 
months of the first site’s implementation. 
 
Both GP and non-GP respondents attributed the negative response of the out-of-hours co-
operative to a loss of GP autonomy. This can only partly explain the negativity. Changing 
roles and the re-configuration of health care work, such as found when nurses take on 
telephone triage previously conducted by GPs, has been shown to create uncertainty and 
a sense of lost autonomy (Williams & Sibbald 1999; Elston & Holloway 2001; Degeling et 
al. 2001). However an additional factor, overlooked by most respondents, was the very 
real sense of ownership both in terms of service development but also in terms of 
company ownership that GPs had in the out-of-hours co-operative. GP out-of-hours co-
operatives had been set up as limited companies contracted to provide out-of-hours care 
and, as such, were not directly part of the NHS. Ignoring this factor had clearly led to an 
under-estimation of the complexity of the organisation, in which each GP member felt that 
their view was equally important to all the others and in which the co-operative Board 
could only act in a representative way rather than in a bureaucratic way.  This enhanced 
sense of an organisational identity or culture within general practice has also been 
identified as contributing to the success or otherwise of the implementation of clinical 
governance within primary care (Marshall et al. 2002). 
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In contrast, although there were similar tensions and difficulties with both the accident and 
emergency department and with the ambulance service, these were less likely to develop 
into open hostility and were also resolved more readily. These services were already part 
of the wider NHS, unlike the independent contractor status of GPs and their co-operatives, 
and their staff had no financial ownership in the organisations. We suggest that this, 
coupled to the transient nature of many of the medical staff in A&E (Allen 1997), may have 
contributed to this. This was even more apparent with the ambulance service, which 
shared a similar identity and ethos to NHS 24, i.e. a national service delivered through 
locally placed call centres and with no strong medical presence dominating the 
organisation. Finally, both A&E and the ambulance service were already used to receiving 
patients from other organisations and the overall contribution of NHS 24 to their workload 
was small (unpublished data). In contrast, the GP out-of-hours co-operative had previously 
been the first point of contact for patients, with NHS 24 now assuming initial responsibility 
for all their patients. Therefore, understanding and trust appeared more readily available 
between the organisations that shared similar identities and ethos to one another, in 
particular the ambulance service and NHS 24.   
 
These organisational identities also impacted on attempts to resolve tensions. Medical 
leaders located within NHS 24 were able to work with both A&E and with the ambulance 
service at an organisational level, where regular meetings helped to ease tensions and 
resolve difficulties. However, with the GP co-operative, it’s Board could again only act as a 
representative of the membership, with all GPs having an equal say in the success or 
otherwise of the implementation.  
 
These tensions were undoubtedly added to by the virtual nature of the system, with care 
being conducted across several organisations. This has implications for current and future 
policy developments, where care may be delivered across organisations using innovative 
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means of communication, for example using paramedics to deliver unscheduled care out-
of-hours.  
 
Out-of-hours care has shown that GPs can readily embrace change and new ways of 
working when it is in their professional interest and is driven from the ground up. Examples 
include the establishment of GP out-of-hours co-operatives in the 1990s (Hallam & 
Henthorne 1999; O'Donnell et al. 1999) and the opt-out from 24-hour responsibility since 
the implementation of the new GMS contract (BMA General Practitioners Committee 
2003). However, new models of service delivery which aim to develop seamless care 
across the whole system (NHS Scotland 2005) will require inter-professional working 
which crosses traditional boundaries. The complex ownerships and identities that exist 
within different parts of the health service need to be recognised and acknowledged before 
change processes can be effective. 
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